In this paper we develop two new chosen plaintext attacks on reduced rounds of the IDEA block cipher. The attacks exploit the word structure of the algorithm and are based on the observation that suitable chosen plaintexts give rise to some special kind of distributions which provide a way to distinguish reduced round IDEA output from a random permutation with very few plaintexts. As a result, we develop an attack for 3.5 rounds of IDEA which requires only 103 chosen plaintexts. We have reduced the number of required plaintexts significantly up to 4 rounds. We also present some interesting properties of the reduced round variants of the cipher which have not been published before. The properties and the attacks bring a different approach to analyse the cipher.
Introduction
The IDEA block cipher is a modified version of the algorithm PES [9] , [10] . The main design concept is "mixing operations from different algebraic groups". The authors have developed the idea of Markov ciphers to evaluate the cipher against differential cryptanalysis. IDEA is an original example of a non Feistel cipher with beautiful mathematical ideas and it has been widely used in commercial environment.
Since its description the process of cryptanalysing IDEA has developed slowly. In [13] and [4] , differential cryptanalysis was applied to IDEA reduced to 2 and 2.5 rounds. In [3] , 3 and 3.5 round IDEA were cryptanalysed using differentiallinear and truncated-differential techniques respectively. Finally in [1] , Biham, Biryukov and Shamir used impossible differential technique to sieve the key space for 3.5, 4 and 4.5 rounds. These are currently the best known attacks on IDEA, and the 4.5 round attack requires the encryption of the whole plaintext space.
Recently we are aware of a paper [14] which uses the square attack technique to analyse 2.5 rounds of PES and IDEA. The authors have also developed a related key square attack on 2.5 rounds of IDEA using 2 chosen plaintexts and 2 17 related keys which recovers 32 key bits.
In this paper we describe some distribution properties of the cipher. Some of these properties are "saturation properties " [12] , [7] . Also there are properties which are similar to the ones used in square attacks [5] . We preferred the name "square-like attack" rather than square or integral attack since we exploit the word structure of the algorithm in a different sense. Mainly we are interested in the distribution of some variables more than taking sum (or integral) of the variables [5] , [8] . Using these distributions we are able to attack the cipher up to 4 rounds. Our main contribution is that we are able to cryptanalyse the cipher with very few chosen plaintexts. This is a result of the powerful eliminating properties of the distributions. As time complexity, our attacks are not better than the known attacks, but we consider that the distribution properties and the reduction of the number of required plaintexts are surprising. We compare our results with the existing ones in Table 1 . Table 1 . Plaintext and time complexity of the attacks on reduced rounds of IDEA
Notation
Throughout this paper we will use the following notation. The plaintext is denoted by (P 1, P 2, P 3, P 4) and ciphertext is denoted by (C1, C2, C3, C4) where the seperated parts show the 16 bit subblocks. The round numbers are denoted by subindices. Therefore C 2 1 denotes the first subblock of the ciphertext after 2 rounds. For convenience we denote the subkeys of the MA-box by K5 and K6, the inputs of the MA-box by p and q and outputs by t and u. We call p as the first input, q the second input, t the first output and u the second output of the MA-box.
Following [12] and [7] we will call a variable "saturated" if it takes every possible value once. For instance if in the plaintext set {(P 1, P 2, P 3, P 4)} the element P 4 takes every 16-bit value once, we say P 4 is saturated. A variable is said to be "k-saturated" if every possible element of the variable is observed exactly k times.
For the least significant bit of a variable we use the abbreviation lsb. Finally K 2 1[97...112] means that the subkey subblock K 2 1 uses the key bits from 97 to 112 of the master key, including the boundaries.
Some Distributions in the IDEA Block Cipher

IDEA Block Cipher
IDEA is a 8.5 round block cipher which uses 3 different group operations on 16 bit subblocks: XOR, modular addition and IDEA multiplication. This multiplication can be described as z = x y, where if any of x or y is 0, we convert that element to 2 16 and calculate z = (x × y) modulo 2 16 + 1. If z is calculated as 2 16 , we convert z to 0. Since 2 16 + 1 is prime, this multiplication is invertible. In [11] Lai suggests that the cipher satisfies "confusion" by using the fact that these operations are incompatible: there are no general commutativity, associativity or distributivity properties when different operations are used respectively. IDEA multiplication provides a strong non-linear component against linear attacks.
The round function of IDEA consists of two parts: first there is a transformation part of each plaintext subblock with the subkey subblocks, i.e. T : (P 1, P 2, P 3, P 4) → (P 1 K1, P 2 K2, P 3 K3, P 4 K4). In the second part we have the MA-box. MA-box has two inputs p = (P 1 K1) ⊕ (P 3 K3) and q = (P 2 K2) ⊕ (P 4 K4). Using p, q and the subkey subblocks K5, K6 we produce two output subblocks t and u. The outputs are calculated as t = ((p K5) q) K6 and u = (p K5) t. The outputs of the MA-box are XORed with the outputs of the transformation part, and the two middle subblocks are exchanged. After 1 round the ciphertext is of the form (C1, C2, C3, C4) where C1 = (P 1 K1) ⊕ t, C2 = (P 3 K3) ⊕ t, C3 = (P 2 K2) ⊕ u, C4 = (P 4 K4) ⊕ u. The cipher is composed of 8 full rounds and 1 extra transformation round. The 128 bit master key is cyclicly shifted left 25 bits a few times to fill an array. Then we get the bits for subkey subblocks from this array respectively. Since 2 2 + 1, 2 4 + 1 and 2 8 + 1 are also prime, it is possible to build smaller variants of IDEA with similiar properties. IDEA with block size 8, 16 and 32 bits can be built with subblock size 2, 4 and 8 respectively.
Remark From [9] we observe that if x, y / ∈ {0, 1}, (x y)+(x (2 16 +1−y)) = 2 16 + 1. Therefore for x, y / ∈ {0, 1}, lsb(x y) = lsb(x (2 16 + 1 − y)) ⊕ 1. Also for any z we have (0 z) (1 z) = 1. As a result for any value of i, there exists a j value, which satisfies lsb(i k) = lsb(j k) ⊕ 1 for all k. This observation will be important during our key elimination process.
Some Distributions
With the diffusion properties of the MA-box, a single bit change in the plaintext is able to change every bit of the ciphertext after 1 round. Therefore classical K4 0 0 0 0 0 0
One Round of IDEA differential and linear attacks become greatly expensive after a few rounds. But we have observed that the word (16 bit) structure of the cipher result some distribution properties. To observe these, we begin with analysing the MA-box. In [11] , Lai claims that MA-box has complete diffusion: each output subblock depends on every input subblock. But this dependency is exact in the following sense: Lemma 1. Let p and q be the inputs of the MA-box respectively. If p is fixed and q is saturated, then both of the outputs t and u of the MA-box are also saturated.
Proof. If p is fixed and q changes over every value, then p K5 is fixed and t = ((p K5) q) K6 changes over every element in 16 bits. Therefore u = t (p K5) changes over every element. Now using this lemma, we have the following result on 1 round distribution of the cipher.
Corollary 1.
Consider the set of plaintexts (P 1, P 2, P 3, P 4) where we fix P 1, P 2, P 3 and P 4 is saturated. Encrypt this set with 1 or 1.5 round IDEA. Then in the ciphertexts (C1, C2, C3, C4), each of the subblocks C1, C2 and C3 are also saturated.
Proof. After the first transformation part, P 1 K1, P 2 K2, P 3 K3 are fixed and since is invertible, P 4 K4 varies on every element. Therefore the first input to the MA-box is fixed, whereas the other varies on every element. By Lemma 1, the outputs of the MA-box take every value once. XOR of a fixed value with all the possible values gives the result.
This distribution can be selected as a distinguisher of 1 or 1.5 round cipher output from a random permutation. The probability of such an event in a random permutation is:
This number is approximately 2 −281720 . This is a strong indicator for one round.
We note that such kind of distributions were used in structural cryptanalysis [2] , the square attack [5] , [6] applied on the ciphers Square and Rijndael by the designers, and the saturation attacks [12] , [7] .
The following property of the MA-box is crucial for us in the development of our attacks.
Proof. Since u = t (p K5) and for the least significant bit XOR is the same as addition, we have lsb(t ⊕ u) = lsb(p K5).
This property is useful for us because 1 bit of information related with MAbox outputs can be got using only one input and one subkey subblock. Therefore in our attacks we consider only the key bits of K5 and the ones acting on p = C1 ⊕ C2.
As a result of Lemma 2, we observe the following fact:
Consider the set of plaintexts obtained by fixing the first 3 subblocks, and letting the last subblock take distinct values. Apply 1 round of IDEA to this set. Then in the ciphertexts (C 1 1, C 1 2, C 1 3, C 1 4) the variables C 1 1 ⊕ C 1 2 and lsb(C 1 2 ⊕ C 1 3) are constant. Therefore as the last subblock takes every 2 16 value, the first input to the MA-box and the last bit of the XOR of middle subblocks are constant.
Proof. We have that p = C 1 1⊕C 1 2 = (P 1 K 1 1)⊕(P 3 K 1 3), therefore the first input of the MA-box is fixed. By Lemma 2, this gives that the last bit of XORs of the MA-box outputs is fixed.
Since for the last bit addition is the same as XOR and the last bit of
is the same for all ciphertexts.
We now extend this result to the second round with the use of Lemma 2. This observation is the basis of our first attack on IDEA block cipher.
Lemma 3.
Consider the set of plaintexts obtained by fixing the first 3 subblocks, and letting the last subblock take distinct values. Apply 2 rounds of IDEA to this set. Then, in the ciphertexts (C 2 1, C 2 2, C 2 3, C 2 4) the variable lsb(C 2 2 ⊕ C 2 3 ⊕ K 5 (C 2 1 ⊕ C 2 2)) takes the same value for all ciphertexts.
Proof. In the second round we have that C 2 
. Since the first 3 subblocks are fixed, by Corollary 2 lsb(C 1 2 ⊕ C 1 3) is constant, and we have the result.
Another consequence of Lemma 2 about the behaviour of 1 round cipher is the following corollary. Corollary 3. Fix the plaintext subblocks P 1, P 3, P 4 and let P 2 take different values. If we apply 1 round IDEA to these plaintexts, then the variable lsb(C 1 2 ⊕ C 1 3) takes the same value for all plaintexts such that lsb(P 2) = 0, and takes the complement of that value for the plaintexts where lsb(P 2) = 1.
Since for the last bit XOR is the same as addition, we have the result.
An Attack on IDEA
Lemma 3 leads to an attack for 2 rounds. We know that the correct value of K 2 5 satisfies the condition that lsb(C 2 2 ⊕ C 2 3 ⊕ K 2 5 (C 2 1 ⊕ C 2 2)) is constant for all ciphertexts when we fix the first 3 subblocks of the plaintexts, where as the wrong key values will behave randomly. To eliminate the key candidates for K 2 5 continue the following steps.
1. Take a set of plaintexts by fixing the first three subblocks and changing the last subblock. Encrypt these plaintexts with 2 rounds of IDEA. 2. For any value of K 2 5, calculate the value of lsb(C 2 2⊕C 2 3⊕K 2 5 (C 2 1⊕C 2 2)) for all ciphertexts. 3. Eliminate the keys where the variable lsb(
does not give the same value for all ciphertexts. 4. If more than 2 keys stay after elimination, take another plaintext where the first three subblocks are the same as previous ones, and the last subblock is different. Repeat step 3 for this ciphertext.
Repeat step 4 until only two key values stay. Recall from Remark in Section 2.1 that, for any value of K 2 5, there exists a K which satisfies lsb(K 2 5 x) = lsb(K x) ⊕ 1 for all x. If K 2 5 / ∈ {0, 1}, this attack eliminates all keys except the correct subkey value K 2 5 and 2 16 + 1 − K 2 5. If K 2 5 ∈ {0, 1}, this attack eliminates all keys except 0 and 1. Therefore it is enough to search half of the key space, but at the end we will have 2 candidates for the subkey subblock K 2 5.
The probability that a wrong key has the property that lsb(C 2 2 ⊕ C 2 3 ⊕ K 2 5 (C 2 1 ⊕ C 2 2)) is constant for m ciphertexts is 1/2 m−1 . Therefore with probability (1 − 1/2 m−1 ) N k /2 , all but 2 of the candidates for the key from a key space of N k elements would be eliminated. Then 2 candidates for K 2 5 may be decided with only 23 chosen plaintexts with a probability about 0.99.
We may use Corollary 2 to decide the subkey values K 2 6, K 2 1, K 2 2 and the correct choice of K 2 5 from the two candidates. Since the first inputs of the MAbox for all the chosen ciphertexts should be equal in the first round, we can easily decide the values of K 2 6, K 2 1 and K 2 2 with the ciphertexts that we used to decide K 2 5. We may decide the remaining 64 bits of the key by exhaustive search. Therefore the total complexity of this attack is about 2 64 .
Consider 2.5 rounds of IDEA. The least significant bit of XOR of the middle blocks is lsb(C 2 2 ⊕ C 2 3 ⊕ K 3 2 ⊕ K 3 3), therefore for any ciphertext set, there are two possible sequences for the variable lsb(C 2 3 ⊕ C 2 3) where one is the complement of the other. Also we may calculate the values of C 2 1 and C 2 2 by trying every possible value for K 3 1 and K 3 2. Then we may check lsb(C 2 2⊕C 2 3⊕ K 2 5 (C 2 1⊕C 2 2)). We continue the steps above and eliminate the subkey values where lsb(C 2 2⊕C 2 3⊕K 2 5 (C 2 1⊕C 2 2)) is not constant for all chosen plaintexts. To decide the correct 48 bit subkey subblock, about 55 chosen plaintexts will be enough to eliminate all the keys with a probability near to 1. As above two keys will survive after the elimination process.
For the 3 round version of this attack, we have to search the subkey subblocks of the MA-box, K 3 5 and K 3 6 also. This requires 2 64 trials for the key and needs about 71 chosen plaintexts. Total complexity of the elimination process is about 2 71 decryptions.
Finally, for the attack on 3.5 rounds, we have to search for K 4 1, K 4 2, K 4 3 and K 4 4 additionally. As a result of the key schedule this attack requires 96 bit key search and needs about 103 chosen plaintexts. The work load of the elimination process is about 2 103 decryptions. This is a divide and conquer attack, after finding the key bits by the elimination process, we find the remaining key bits by exhaustive search. For the 2.5 round attack, after finding two candidates for the subkey subblocks K 2 5, K 3 1 and K 3 2, we decide the remaining subblocks by trying every possible combination of 80 bits. Then total complexity of the attack is about 2 81 . For the 3 and 3.5 round attacks, the work done to decide the remaining key bits is negligible near the work done during the elimination process. The results are summarised in Table 1 .
For this type of attacks, we have considered the following subkey subblocks: 
More Distributions
Using the word structure of the algorithm, we want to extend our observations to the third round. For this reason we need the following lemma and corollary. Proof. Recall from Corollary 1 that, if we fix the first 3 subblocks of the plaintext and change the last subblock over every possible 16 bit value, then after 1 round, the variables C 1 1, C 1 2, C 1 3, t 1 , u 1 are all saturated. On the other hand if we change P 2 to P 2 and repeat this procedure again, we will obtain the same set of (t 1 , u 1 ) s. Therefore, if (x, y, z, s) is a ciphertext in E, then there will be exactly one element in E with the first two subblocks x and y, respectively. To produce the same t 1 , u 1 , we should have z ⊕ s = z ⊕ s .
Observe that although there is a great similarity between the sets E and E , it is not possible to see this using classical differential analysis. Because where the similiar ciphertext pairs, i.e. (x, y, z, s) and (x, y, z , s ) occur is not certain directly from the plaintext differences. This relation can be seen if we compare a set of ciphertexts with respect to another one.
For different values of the second subblock we obtain distinct z and s values. As a result we have the following: The outputs of 2 round IDEA seem to be randomly distributed, but the following interesting properties are again result of the word structure of the algorithm.
Corollary 5.
Let the set P be defined as in Corollary 4 and let E 2 denote the set obtained when P is encrypted with 2 round IDEA. Let r i denote the XOR of the i-th subblocks of the ciphertexts, r 5 denote the XOR of the first outputs, and r 6 denote the XOR of the second outputs of the MA-box of all the elements of E 2 . Then we have r 1 = r 2 = r 5 and r 3 = r 4 = r 6 .
Proof. When P is encrypted with 1 round IDEA, for each value of x, there is a set M x defined as in Corollary 4. In each of these sets, the third and fourth subblocks visit each 16 bit value once. Therefore after 1 round each subblock of the ciphertext will take every value 2 16 times. In the second round we have
The terms in paranthesis repeat equal times so their XOR is 0 and we have the result. This is very similiar to the result used in the square attack [5] . It is trivial that an attack can also be developed using this property, but we skip this as it neither decreases the number of plaintexts nor the total complexity. Instead, we use this property as a part of our second attack on 3 rounds. Corollary 6. If we fix the first and third subblocks of the plaintexts and range the second and fourth ones over all 2 32 values, then in the second round we have that the first input of the MA-box takes is 2 16 -saturated.
Proof. By Lemma 4, the ciphertext set after 1 round may be decomposed into sets M x = (x, y, z, s) where x and y are fixed, and z and s change over every possible element . For a ciphertext (x, y, z, t) in M x , the first input to the MA-box in the second round is p = (x K 2 1) ⊕ (z K 2 3). Since x is fixed and z changes over every element, for one set, p visits every element exactly once. For every different value of x, we have such a set, therefore we have the result.
This distribution may also be used as a distinguisher of the cipher from a random permutation. The probability of such an event in a random permutation is:
This is approximately
Our main result which is used in the attack for 4 rounds is the following: Theorem 1. Let P = {(P 1, P 2, P 3, P 4)} and P = {(P 1 , P 2, P 3 , P 4)} denote the sets of plaintexts where P 1, P 3, P 1 , P 3 are fixed, and P 2 and P 4 take every possible value. Encrypt these sets with 3 rounds of IDEA. Denote the resulting sets by E 3 and E 3 respectively. Let n 0 denote the number of 0's of the variable
Then the number of 0's of the variable lsb( is of the form (K 2 3 z) ⊕ t 2 ⊕ (K 2 2 y) ⊕ u 2 for (x, y, z, s) and (K 2 3 z) ⊕ t 2 ⊕ (K 2 2 y ) ⊕ u 2 for (x, y , z, s ) for some t 2 , u 2 , t 2 , u 2 . But since the first input of the MA-box in the second round is p = (x K 2 1)⊕(z K 2 3) for both (x, y, z, s) and (x, y , z, s ), Lemma 2 implies lsb(t 2 ⊕ u 2 ) = lsb(t 2 ⊕ u 2 ). Therefore it is enough to show that lsb(y ⊕ y ) is constant for every value of y and y . But y = (P 3 K 1 3) ⊕ t 1 and y = (P 3 K 1 3) ⊕ t 1 for some t 1 , t 1 . The first subblocks are equal in the first round, so we have x = (P 1 K 1 1) ⊕ t 1 = (P 1 K 1 1) ⊕ t 1 which implies t 1 ⊕ t 1 = (P 1 K 1 1) ⊕ (P 1 K 1 1). Since P 3 and P 3 are constant and t 1 ⊕ t 1 depends only on P 1 and P 1 , we have the result.
After observing the distributions as a result of the word structure, it is natural to ask the question what happens if we fix one subblock only, and change the remaining three subblocks over every possible element. We would like to conclude this section with the answer of this question. Theorem 2. Let us fix one of the subblocks P 1 or P 3 in the plaintexts (P 1, P 2, P 3, P 4) and change the other three subblocks over all possible values. Encrypt these plaintexts with 3 round IDEA. Then in the ciphertexts (C 3 1, C 3 2, C 3 3, C 3 4), the variable lsb(C 3 2 ⊕ C 3 3 ⊕ K 3 5 (C 3 1 ⊕ C 3 2)) takes the value 0 and 1, exactly equal, i.e. 2 47 times.
This follows from the fact that in the proof of Theorem 1, lsb(t⊕t ) and lsb(P 3⊕ P 3 ) take the value of 0 and 1 equal times when ranging over one of P 1 or P 3 and keeping the other constant. This is also a strong distinguisher from random. The probability of having equal number of 0's and 1's in a random binary sequence of 2 48 elements is:
Using Stirling's Approximation, this number is approximately 2 −24 .
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 both consider the same variable. Theorem 2 is a much stronger distinguisher than Theorem 1, but we prefer to use the first one in an attack since it requires less number of plaintexts.
Another Attack on IDEA
Using Theorem 1, we may develop an attack on 3 rounds of the cipher. The attack proceeds as follows.
1.
Take two plaintext sets of 2 32 elements where the first and third subbloks are different fixed values and the second and fourth subblocks change over every possible element. Encrypt these sets with 3 rounds of IDEA. 2. For every possible value of the subkey K 3 5, count the number of 0's and 1's of the variable lsb(C 3 2 ⊕ C 3 3 ⊕ K 3 5 (C 3 1 ⊕ C 3 2)) for both sets. 3. Let us denote the number of 0's and 1's of the first set by n 0 and n 1 and the second set r 0 and r 1 respectively. Eliminate the keys where the sets {n 0 , n 1 } and {r 0 , r 1 } do not coincide. 4. If more than 2 key values stay, then change the fixed part and take another set of 2 32 plaintexts by ranging the second and fourth subblocks over every possible element. Continue the elimination by the same way.
Consider two random binary sequences of 2 32 elements. The probability that the number of 0's of the first sequence is equal to either the number of 0's or the number of 1's of the second sequence is:
We may approximate this probability as follows. Since we are counting the number of 0's, this is a binomial distribution. We have the parameters N = 2 32 and p = 1/2. Therefore this distribution has mean µ = 2 31 and variance σ 2 = 2 30 . Since N is large and p = 1/2, we may assume that the number of 0's are normally distributed for both sets. Define a new variable as the difference of the number of 0's of two sets, i.e. X 0 = n 0 − r 0 . Then X 0 is normally distributed with mean µ = 0 and variance σ 2 = 2 31 . Now for any value of we may calculate the probability that X 0 lies between − and .
For instance for = 512 this probability is about 2 −25 . Since P (n 0 = c or n 0 = 2 32 − c) = 2P (n 0 = c), our probability is 2 times this probability. Therefore only 2 plaintext sets will be enough to decide the two candidates of K 3 5. By Remark in Section 2.1, there is a K value which satisfies lsb(K35 x) = lsb(K x) ⊕ 1 and as in the previous one, this attack eliminates all but 2 keys. This attack requires about 2 33 chosen plaintexts and 2 16 key search, and the work load in the elimination process is about 2 49 . We may use Corollary 5 or Corollary 6 to decide the subkey blocks K 3 6, K 3 1, K 3 2 and the correct choice of K 3 5. Using these subkey values, we decrypt the ciphertexts and find the values of C 2 1 and C 2 2 to check if the conditions of the corollaries are satisfied. To decide the correct combination of K 3 3 and K 3 4 we may use Corollary 5 similarly with the values of C 2 3 and C 2 4. After finding these subkey subblocks, the remaining bits can be found by exhaustive search. Therefore the total work done in this attack is about 2 49 decryptions for 2 33 plaintexts, 2 82 . To extend the attack on 3.5 rounds, we shall search for the keys K 3 5, K 4 1 and K 4 2 since K 4 1 and K 4 2 are the subkey subblocks which affect the first two subblocks in the transformation part of the fourth round. Therefore we have to do 2 48 trials for key search, and on the average 48/24 = 2 comparisons will be enough to find 2 candidates for the correct key combination. About 3 plaintexts sets are required for the elimination process. The remaining 80 bits can be found by trying every possible combination. The total complexity of this attack is about 2 82 .
We continue this way. For a 4 round attack we have to search for K 4 5 and K 4 6 also. This brings extra 32 bits search. Therefore totally we will search for 80 bits of the key. About 4 sets will be enough to eliminate all the keys in this case. The remaining subkey values are found by an exhaustive search.
For a 4.5 round attack, we have to search K 5 1, K 5 2, K 5 3 and K 5 4 additionally. But as a result of the key schedule, some of the bits we are searching are common and indeed we have to search for 114 bits. Again about 4 sets will be enough to find out the correct 114 bit combination. It is trivial that the attack for 4.5 rounds is slower than exhaustive search, but it is interesting to see that the number of required plaintexts do not change significantly as the number of rounds increase. This is a result of the strong distinguishing properties of the distributions.
The subkey subblocks we have used for this version of the attack are the following: 
Conclusion
We have observed some interesting distribution properties of the IDEA block cipher reduced to 1, 2 and 3 rounds as a result of the word structure of the algorithm. With the use of these properties, we have developed two chosen plaintext attacks. Up to 4 rounds, we are able to decrease the number of required plaintexts for an attack, but our total time complexities are not smaller than the known attacks. We consider that the distribution properties bring a different view to analyse the cipher, and they can be useful in the future attacks with more rounds. As an open question we remark that, if any distinguishing property related with the distribution of the last bits of the middle blocks of ciphertexts in the third round is found, this will immediately give rise to attacks for 4.5 or more rounds using the ideas in this paper.
